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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION IN NEW YORK: AN OVERVIEW AND
SURVEY
DOMENICK L. GABRiELLi* and JoHN M. NONNA**
INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies have in recent years assumed a signifi-
cant role in adjudicating various disputes, particularly where strong
public policy interests are implicated.1 This adjudicatory role is
conferred upon administrative entities by statutes such as the New
York Human Rights Law,2 the New York Social Services Law,' and
* Associate Judge, New York Court of Appeals. B.S., St. Lawrence University; LL.B.,
1936, Albany Law School of Union University; Justice, New York Supreme Court 1961-
1967; Associate Justice, New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Third Department,
1967-1969, and Fourth Department, 1969-1973.
** A.B., 1970, Princeton University; J.D., 1975, New York University School of Law.
Member of the New York Bar.
I As society became more complex, a "fourth branch" of government was needed. The
administrative agency is better equipped than the courts to process large amounts of informa-
tion and to create uniform rules, while it is more flexible than Congress in promulgating
standards. The major duties of the agency are to license conduct by establishing norms and
procedures for enforcement, and to make reparations to injured parties. See 1 K. DAVIs,
ADMuNISTRAnVE LAW § 1.05 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvis]. As one commentator has
noted, "[t]he vastness and efficiency of commercial and industrial transportation and com-
munication, the mutual fairness of labor-management relations, and all other mundane con-
cerns of present day governmental agencies are foundation supports to basic individual rights
.... " Prettyman, The Nature of Administrative Law, 44 VA. L. Rxv. 685, 698 (1958). See
generally L. JAFFE & N. NATHASON, ADMNISTRATIVE LAW (4th ed. 1976); Loevinger, The
Administrative Agency as a Paradigm of Government-A Survey of the Administrative
Process, 40 INn. L.J. 287 (1965).
2 New York's Human Rights Law is contained in article 15 of the New York Executive
Law and provides in part:
The State Division of Human Rights, by and through the commissioner or his
duly authorized officer. . . shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
To adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind suitable rules and regulations to
carry out the provisions of this article. ...
To develop human rights plans and policies for the state . . . and to make
investigations. . . appropriate to effectuate this article. . . and to promote good-
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the New York Worker's Compensation Law.4 Generally, agencies
operate within the framework of legislative enactments which cir-
cumscribe their functions and prescribe a procedural context for the
resolution of disputes.5 While administrative officials are frequently
cast in the role of impartial arbiters, they are often simultaneously
responsible for safeguarding the public interest, which, at times,
may conflict with the interests of one of the parties to a dispute.
Because of this dual role, judicial review is essential to ensure that
an agency is not violating the legislative constraints placed upon its
decision-making authority or too zealously pursuing its statutory
mandate at the expense of fairness to the parties.8
will and minimize or eliminate discrimination because of age, creed, color, sex or
national origin.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 295 (McKinney 1977).
N.Y. Soc. SEmv. LAW § 20 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1977-1978).
N.Y. WoRK. COMP. LAW §§ 140-142 (McKinney 1977). The New York Legislature re-
cently changed the short title of the Workmen's Compensation Law to read "Worker's Com-
pensation Law." Ch. 79, [1978] N.Y. Laws 253 (McKinney).
I Most agencies operate under an adversary system whereby complaints and answers are
filed, a hearing is held and a decision is reached. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297 (McKinney
1977); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 706 (McKinney 1977).
A distinction should be made between the "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative" func-
tions of an agency. A quasi-judicial action is one that directly affects an individual's rights.
In such cases an adversary hearing is required. Professor Davis has stated:
A party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake in a determination of
government action should be entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with
the weapons of rebuttal evidence, cross-examination and argument, unfavorable
evidence of adjudicative facts, except in the rare circumstance when some other
interest . . . justifies an overriding of the interest in a fair hearing.
DAvis, supra note 1, at § 7.02. Illustrative of quasi-judicial actions are the revocation of Social
Security benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and parole revocation, Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). An agency performing in a quasi-judicial role does not have
to adhere to the strict procedural rules which govern the judiciary. As the New York Court
of Appeals stated in Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954):
The hearing held by an administrative tribunal . . . may be more or less
informal. Technical legal rules of evidence and procedure may be disregarded.
Nevertheless, no essential element of a fair trial can be dispensed with unless
waived.. . . [A] party whose rights are being determined must be fully apprised
of the claims of the opposing party and . . . be given the opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence in explanation or
rebuttal ...
Id. at 470, 121 N.E.2d at 425 (citations omitted); accord, Murray v. Murphy, 24 N.Y.2d 150,
247 N.E.2d 143, 299 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1969); Marchesi v. Cowen, 31 App. Div. 2d 765, 297
N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1969); see N.Y. WoRK. CoMp. LAW app. § 300.9 (McKinney Supp.
1977-1978) ("The board shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or
by technical or formal rules of procedure").
A quasi-legislative action focuses on the future and is usually applicable to an unspeci-
fied class of persons, rather than to a particular individual. In such cases the general rule is
that no hearing is required. Quasi-legislative functions include the promulgation of rules by
the agency. See DAvis, Armn m 'RATmv LAW OF THE SEvENTIEs §§ 5.01-6.13 (1976).
0 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 276 App. Div. 388, 94
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The purpose of this Article is to examine the judicial function
in reviewing the adjudication of disputes by administrative entities
and to delineate the nature and extent of judicial review as estab-
lished by the legislature and developed by the courts. The Article
will focus on the scope of judicial review with respect to specific
agencies as illustrative of the relationship between the court and the
administrative agency. Two general areas of inquiry will be pur-
sued: first, the standards governing judicial review of the agency's
substantivedeterminations; and second, the constitutional and sta-
tutory restraints upon administrative authority.
JuDimcL REvIEw OF AGENCY FINDINGS
Findings of Fact
Generally, determinations of whether "a phenomenon had hap-
pened or is or will be happening"7 present issues of fact to be re-
solved by the agency.8 As a result, in many cases it is provided by
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1st Dep't 1950). In Reynolds, although the court noted that judicial review is
limited by the "substantial evidence" standard, see notes 43-44 and accompanying text infra,
it annulled the agency's determination to discharge petitioner, stating: "[A] court must
consider on the one hand that . . . determinations may not be disturbed where there is
substantial evidence to support them.. . , and on the other hand a reviewing court must
also consider that insufficiency of evidence is, in the eyes of the law, no evidence. . . ." 276
App. Div. at 393, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 845. The court was particularly concerned with "the likeli-
hood of error in the observations" made by witnesses alleging petitioner's misconduct. Id. at
393, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 846. Thus, the case was remitted for a hearing in light of "the seriousness
.. . of the charges preferred against this petitioner, his prior good record of employment and
his status as a war veteran." Id.; see, e.g., First Am. Natural Ferns Co. v. Picard, 175 Misc.
280, 23 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1940). The courts are particularly concerned
with the maintenance of fairness. Although a hearing need not follow strict procedural rules,
see note 5 supra, administrative decisions have been invalidated where agency procedures
encroach on basic rights. See, e.g., Finn's Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 24 N.Y.2d
647, 249 N.E.2d 440, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1969) (illegally seized evidence may not be the basis
of a denial of a liquor license); Murray v. Murphy, 24 N.Y.2d 150, 247 N.E.2d 143, 299
N.Y.S.2d 175 (1969) (notice of charges must be given); 245 Elmwood Avenue, Inc. v. State
Liquor Auth., 14 App. Div. 2d 393, 222 N.Y.S.2d 117 (4th Dep't 1961), aff'd mem., 11 N.Y.2d
980, 183 N.E.2d 701, 229 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1962) (agency may not unduly limit cross-
examination).
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMnISTRATivE AIION 548 (1958) (emphasis omitted).
The administrative factfinding process, simply stated, involves the application of
agency expertise to the evidence which has been gathered. Ultimately, the facts are measured
against the relevant statutory standard and a decision is reached. See Saginaw Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 613 (1938). See generally DAvis,
supra note 1, § 16.06, at 450.
The credibility of witnesses and the inferences drawn are component parts of this deci-
sional process and are thereby subject to limited judicial review. See Stork Restaurant Inc.
v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 26 N.E.2d 247 (1940); Francese v. Waterfront Comm., 56 App. Div.
2d 535, 391 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 43 N.Y.2d 657, 371 N.E.2d 533, 400
N.Y.S.2d 815 (1977); Wiener v. Gabel, 18 App. Div. 2d 1025, 239 N.Y.S.2d 48 (2d Dep't 1963).
1978]
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statute that an agency's findings of fact "are conclusive if supported
by sufficient evidence on the record considered as a whole."' This
traditional deference to the agency in its fact-finding role is a result
of the realization that administrative bodies, through consistent
exposure to varying sets of facts, are able to develop a high level of
expertise.10 Thus, while "the scope of judicial review of administra-
tive actions ranges from . . . complete unreviewability to complete
substitution of judicial judgment on all questions, the dominant
tendency . . . is toward [application of] . . . the test of reasona-
bleness in reviewing findings of fact."'"
Inferences Drawn From Factual Findings
In addition to their fact finding function, administrative agen-
cies in New York are empowered to draw inferences from the facts
thereby established. 2 An inference is "[a] process of reasoning by
which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a
logical consequence from . . . a state of facts, already proved or
admitted."' 3 Generally, the issue whether a particular fact permits
the agency to draw an inference having legal consequences presents
a question of law within the province of the reviewing court.'4 Since
' See, e.g., N.Y. Exac. LAW § 298 (McKinney 1977); N.Y. LAB. LAw § 707 (McKinney
1977); N.Y. PuB. SFRV. LAW § 128(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
,0 Fact finding is generally reserved to agencies due to overcrowded court dockets and
the necessity of speedy and efficient disposition of a variety of technical issues. Since agencies
have more relaxed standards of procedure and pre-existing sources of information, the agency
is considered to have acquired a "logic of experience." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIS-
TRATvE AcTIoN 552 (1958). See Ahsaf v. Nyquist, 37 N.Y.2d 182, 332 N.E.2d 880, 371
N.Y.S.2d 705 (1975); Town of Clay v. Helsby, 51 App. Div. 2d 200, 379 N.Y.S.2d 896 (4th
Dep't 1976). See generally DAvis, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 37-40; Jaffe, Judicial Review:
Question of Fact, 69 HAv. L. RaV. 1020 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Question of Fact];
Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process, 28
FORDHAM L. Rav. 1 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Process]; Loevinger, The
Administrative Agency as a Paradigm of Government-A Survey of the Administrative
Process, 40 IND. L.J. 287 (1965).
" DAvis, supra note 1, at § 29.01.
,2 See Gordon v. New York Life Ins. Co., 300 N.Y. 652, 90 N.E.2d 898 (1950) (per curiam);
Wiener v. Gabel, 18 App. Div. 2d 1025, 239 N.Y.S.2d 48 (2d Dep't 1963). Generally inferences
may be categorized as factual or legal in nature. "The process of inference from evidence to
fact is based on 'reasoning,' on the application of the finder's theory of experience." Jaffe,
Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 245 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Question of Law]. When based on the evidence before it, the agency is thus making a factual
inference. As discussed by Professor Davis, however, a legal inference can result if a conclu-
sion is routinely drawn from a particular set of circumstances. DAvIs, supra note 1, § 29.05.
t, BLACK's LAW DIcroNARY 917 (4th ed. 1968); see Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Me. 458, 50
A. 240 (1901).
11 See notes 8 supra & 15 infra; see, e.g., Fisher v. Levine, 36 N.Y.2d 46, 325 N.E.2d 151,
365 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1975); Van Treslaar v. Levine, 35 N.Y.2d 311, 319 N.E.2d 702, 361
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other factors are operative in the decisional process in addition to
the factual record and the applicable statutory criteria, the process
of reaching legal conclusions on the basis of the evidence presented
may result in the obfuscation of the distinction between findings of
fact and conclusions of law. For example, the well-settled rule that
statistical proof alone is insufficient to establish a discriminatory
practice 5 is founded on logic and experience rather than on a literal
reading of the statute.16 In developing such standards to govern the
legal significance of particular facts, the court is not usurping the
factfinding role of the agency but is merely exercising its right to
review questions of law. These rules governing the adjudicatory pro-
cess rest ultimately on common sense which cannot be excluded
from the dynamics of judicial decision making. What has evolved
is a legal rule articulated in case law which is drawn from common
experience.17
Unemployment Benefits and the Doctrine of Provoked Discharge
Judicial control of an agency's ability to draw inferences is
illustrated by the administratively created doctrine of provoked dis-
charge. Pursuant to the New York Labor Law, the validity of a
claim for unemployment benefits is initially determined by the in-
dustrial commissioner in accordance with regulations established by
him."8 A claimant or other affected party dissatisfied with the initial
N.Y.S.2d 338 (1974); Consolidated Water Co. v. Maltbie, 167 Misc. 269,3 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1938).
" State Div. of Human Rights v. Columbia Univ., 39 N.Y.2d 612, 616, 350 N.E.2d 396,
398, 385 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21.
" The rule governing statistical proof in discrimination cases expresses the view that, if
relied upon for the legal conclusion that a discriminatory practice has occurred, statistical
evidence requires a foundation. With respect to employment practices, it must be established
that the group from which the statistical evidence is derived consists of persons who are
eligible for the position at issue. In addition, or alternatively, some proof of "employment
practices in the individual case" is required to "warrant the conclusion, based on direct
evidence or rational inference, or both that there is a. . . discriminatory practice." State Div.
of Human Rights v. Kilian Mfg. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 201, 212, 318 N.E.2d 770,775, 360 N.Y.S.2d
603, 611 (1974); see notes 10 supra & 58 infra. See generally Question of Law, supra note 12,
at 246.
" See generally DAvis, supra note 1, § 30.01-.14.
'a N.Y. LAB. LAw § 597 (McKinney 1977). The powers of the Industrial Commissioner
are set forth in New York Labor Law § 530 (McKinney 1977), which provides in part:
1. General powers. The commissioner shall administer this article and. .. he
shall have power to make all rules and regulations and. . . to appoint such officers
.. . as may be necessary in the administration of this article.
The commissioner is hereby further authorized, empowered and directed to
take such steps and to formulate such plans and to execute such projects as may
1978]
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determination may request a hearing before a referee. The referee's
decision may be appealed to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board which may decide the appeal on the basis of the existing
record or may hold a hearing de novo and make its own findings."
It is. also significant that a decision of the appeal board "shall be
final on all questions of fact and, unless appealed from,"5 shall be
final on all questions of law."'
Despite this strong statutory language with respect to the con-
clusiveness of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board decisions,
the New York Court of Appeals has intervened to prohibit the draw-
ing of unjustified legal inferences by the appeal board. The adminis-
tratively developed doctrine of "provoked discharge" provides an
example of when and to what extent the court will intervene. The
New York Labor Law provides for, inter alia, a denial of unemploy-
ment benefits when the claimant has "voluntarily" terminated
employment "without good cause."2 "Provoked discharge" was rec-
ognized by the New York Court of Appeals in In re Malaspinam to
encompass cases where the employee can be said to have left his
employment voluntarily by leaving his employer no choice but to
discharge him.U In Malaspina, the employee's collective bargaining
be necessary to appropriate to obtain for and on behalf of the state the full benefits,
advantages and privileges. . . pursuant to. .. [the Wagner-Peyser Act].
" N.Y. LAB. LAw § 621(3) (McKinney 1977).
Pursuant to section 624 of the New York Labor Law, appeal board determinations of
questions of law may be appealed to the Appellate Division, Third Department. N.Y. LAB.
LAw § 624 (McKinney 1977). The section specifically provides:
[Any. .. party. . . affected [by a decision of the appeal board] who appeared
at the appeal before the board may appeal questions of law involved in such deci-
sion to the appellate division of the supreme court, third department. The board
may also, in its discretion, certify to such court questions of law involved in its
decisions.
Id.; see, e.g., Fisher v. Levine, 36 N.Y.2d 146, 325 N.E.2d 151, 365 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1975); In re
Dresher, 286 App. Div. 591, 146 N.Y.S.2d 428 (3d Dep't 1955).
11 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1977). Despite clear statutory language, some courts
have applied the substantial evidence test to Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board find-
ings of fact. See, e.g., Fisher v. Levine, 36 N.Y.2d 146, 325 N.E.2d 151, 365 N.Y.S.2d 828
(1975), wherein the court stated that according to the statute "as to pure questions of fact,
and factual inferences to be drawn therefrom, a decision of the Appeal Board, which then
acts quasi-judicially, would be conclusive upon the courts if supported by substantial evi-
dence." Id. at 150, 325 N.E.2d at 153, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 832; see Samperi v. Kramer, 49 App.
Div. 2d 979, 374 N.Y.S.2d 369 (3d Dep't 1975)(mem.); Miller v. Levine, 37 App. Div. 2d 873,
325 N.Y.S.2d 6 (3d Dep't 1971).
2 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593 (McKinney 1977). Other grounds for denial of benefits include:
refusal of an offer of employment, misconduct, and criminal acts. Id.
" 309 N.Y. 413, 131 N.E.2d 709 (1956), aff'g 285 App. Div. 564, 139 N.Y.S.2d 521 (3d
Dep't 1955).
2, "Provoked discharge" is distinguishable from dismissal due to misconduct; in the
former situation the employer has no choice but to fire the recalcitrant employee because,
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agreement provided that employees were required to join the union
within 60 days after being hired and that failure to join or pay union
dues would result in discharge by the employer. The claimant was
informed of these provisions when hired. The Appellate Division
upheld the initial determination of the industrial commissioner,
finding that the claimant, by refusing to join the union, left his
employment "voluntarily" and "without good cause." The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the claimant actually
provoked his own discharge by refusing to join the union.26
In James v. Levine,2 the Court of Appeals severely criticized
the appeal board's extension of the "provoked discharge" doctrine
beyond its limited application in Malaspina. The court asserted
that the doctrine was a "legitimate and essential gloss on the statute
to fill a gap" in light of the circumstances of Malaspina, but that
the appeal board had expanded the doctrine to create a distinct
justification for denial of unemployment insurance benefits.2 How-
ever beneficial its purpose in denying benefits on the ground of
voluntary termination of employment rather than on the more seri-
ous grounds of misconduct, the error in the agency's reasoning was
that the result was not authorized by the statute.30 Thus, the
"provoked discharge" doctrine is unavailable in the situation in
which an employer has a choice whether to discharge an employee
for example, of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement. See De Grego v. Levine, 39
N.Y.2d 180, 347 N.E.2d 611, 383 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1976); In re Malaspina, 309 N.Y. 413, 131
N.E.2d 709 (1956).
2 285 App. Div. at 567, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
2 309 N.Y. at 418, 131 N.E.2d at 711.
- 34 N.Y.2d 491, 315 N.E.2d 471, 358 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1974). James combined three cases
wherein the claimants appealed the determination of "provoked discharge." The first claim-
ant was warned that she would be discharged if she appeared at work intoxicated. The
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board found that she voluntarily left work by showing up
drunk and thus provoked her discharge. Id. at 496, 315 N.E.2d at 474, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
The second claimant was granted a 1-week leave to recuperate from an accident. The appeal
board determined that she had provoked her discharge by being absent for 3 weeks without
permission. Id. at 497, 315 N.E.2d at 474, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 415. In the third case the claimant
left a meeting after being warned that it would be considered an act of insubordination, and
was found to have provoked her discharge. Id. at 497-98, 315 N.E.2d at 474, 358 N.Y.S.2d at
415.
2 Id. at 494-95, 315 N.E.2d at 472, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
2 The agency sought to justify the administrative extension of the doctrine on the salu-
tary grounds of "the pre-1958 difference in eligibility periods between voluntary separation
and misconduct," and secondly "the reluctance to stigmatize a discharged employee with
misconduct." The court rejected these contentions as "logically mischievious." Id.
Although the court was distressed with the extension of the provoked discharge doc-
trine, it affirmed all three decisions since "the net effect would be only to substitute the
correct category for the misapplied doctrine." Id. at 497, 315 N.E.2d at 474, 358 N.Y.S.2d at
415.
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whose performance is unsatisfactory. In such cases, the acts of the
employee resulting in discharge must amount to misconduct under
the statute in order to justify denial of unemployment benefits.3 1
While the limitation of the doctrine did not afford relief to the
claimants in James and its companion cases,3" the ruling therein
was applied in De Grego v. Levinen3 to overturn a denial of benefits
by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. The claimant in De
Grego had been employed as a plumber's helper for over 2 years and
his employment was satisfactory. His duties consisted primarily of
performing services on his employer's premises and he was provided
with a uniform bearing the company's name. For 2 days prior to his
discharge he wore on his uniform a button upon which was inscribed
the statement "Impeachment with Honor." On the second day, the
company president informed the claimant that he could not wear
the button if he wished to keep his job. De Grego believed he was
entitled to express a personal political view and hence refused to
remove the button. Consequently, he was fired. 4
Throughout the agency adjudicatory and review process, the
claimant was denied unemployment benefits on the ground that he
left his employment without good cause. The Appellate Division
reversed on the ground that unemployment benefits could not be
denied where the discharge was based on the claimant's exercise of
the freedom of expression, 5 but the Court of Appeals, in affirming,
did not find it necessary to reach the constitutional issue. The court
reaffirmed the holding in James:
Provoked discharge, a gloss over the statutory disqualification
for voluntary separation without good cause (Labor Law § 593,
subd. 1) is a narrowly drawn legal fiction designed to apply where
an employee voluntarily engages in conduct which transgresses a
legitimate known obligation and leaves the employer no choice but
to discharge him.3
In De Grego, of course, there was no obligation upon the em-
ployee,3 the violation of which would literally compel his discharge
" See note 24 supra.
32 See note 30 supra.
39 N.Y.2d 180, 347 N.E.2d 611, 383 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1976), aff'g 46 App. Div. 2d 253,
362 N.Y.S.2d 207 (3d Dep't 1974).
39 N.Y.2d at 182-83, 347 N.E.2d at 612, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
46 App. Div. 2d at 255, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
" 39 N.Y.2d at 183, 347 N.E.2d at 613, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
The record did not indicate the existence of any company policy or regulation prohibit-
ing the wearing of buttons. By comparison, in Malaspina joining the union was a condition
precedent to employment, thus placing an affirmative obligation upon the employee. In re
Malaspina, 309 N.Y. at 418, 131 N.E.2d at 711.
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as in Malaspina. In contrast to James, the court did not conclude
that the claimant's acts amounted to misconduct, a separate ground
for the denial of benefits pursuant to Labor Law section 593.11 The
court, of course, was bound by the factual findings of the appeal
board which had adopted the referee's findings that the claimant
was discharged as a result of his failure to remove the button bearing
his political statement. The court, therefore, did not invade the
statutorily protected domain of the agency but rather exercised its
own power to decide questions of law and curtail the agency from
exceeding its legislative authority. 9The Malaspina, James, and De Grego cases demonstrate the
manner in which the courts will control the agency's adjudicatory
activity by insuring that it does not draw improper legal inferences
from the record. Where the agency's application of the statute raises
the question whether the statutory language has been misapplied or
improperly extended, the court will reverse on the ground that the
agency has exceeded its authority in developing a legal theory which
essentially disregards the statutory criteria. 0
Ultimate Determinations
Where the validity of an agency's ultimate determination is
challenged, judicial review follows a somewhat different path.4 Al-
- 39 N.Y.2d at 184, 347 N.E.2d at 613, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
" See note 41 infra.
" As the court stated in James, there are cases "which appear to have tolerated the
unauthorized expansion of the doctrine" beyond its legitimate use. 34 N.Y.2d at 495, 315
N.E.2d at 473, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 413 (1974); see, e.g., Gladstone v. Catherwood, 30 N.Y.2d 576,
281 N.E.2d 842, 330 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1972) (refusal to cut hair); Kreager v. Catherwood, 34 App.
Div. 2d 1033, 311 N.Y.S.2d 69 (3d Dep't 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970) (abusive
conduct with clients).
De Grego severely limited the provoked discharge doctrine by holding that "[a]side from
the extreme situation presented in Malaspina ...the concept of provoked discharge is
without validity and may not be used to deny benefits." 39 N.Y.2d at 185, 347 N.E.2d at 613-
14, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
" While administrative determinations of questions of law are totally reviewable by the
courts, see, e.g., Fisher v. Levine, 36 N.Y.2d 146, 325 N.E.2d 151, 365 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1975);
Van Teslaar v. Levine, 35 N.Y.2d 311, 319 N.E.2d 702, 361 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1974); Guardian
Life Ins. Co. v. Bohlinger, 308 N.Y. 174, 124 N.E.2d 110 (1954), and questions of fact are
subject to less searching review, see notes 44 & 45 infra, usually a mixed question of law and
fact is involved, i.e., the making of legal determinations by applying an established rule to a
set of narrow circumstances. In Construction Management Corp. v. Brown & Root, Inc., 41
Misc. 2d 864, 246 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), modified, 25 App. Div. 2d 843, 270
N.Y.S.2d 95 (1st Dep't 1964), the court stated:
If ambiguity is susceptible to interpretation within the four comers of the instru-
ment, it is purely a question of law. But if there be need to resort to extraneous
evidence, for construction rather than interpretation, then it is a mixed question;
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though it is clear that review of factual findings and review of ulti-
mate determinations are separate and distinct inquiries, the stan-
dard of review with respect to the latter is dependent on the nature
of the factfinding process itself. The New York Civil Practice Law
and -Rules (CPLR) section 7803 contains a dual standard of review
utilized when an agency determination is challenged by way of an
article 78 proceeding: 2
[A] reviewing court may consider:
3. Whether a determination was arbitrary and capricious or an
abuse of discretion.
4. Whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held
and at which evidence was taken pursuant to direction of law is
on the entire record, supported by substantial evidence."3
The crucial factor in determining which standard is to be ap-
plied is whether a hearing is statutorily or constitutionally required.
If an agency decision follows an adversary-type hearing at which all
parties have an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses, the reviewing court would apply the more stringent
"substantial evidence" test." On the other hand, if the agency adju-
the ultimate law question depending for its resolution upon the preliminary deter-
mination of the fact question ....
41 Misc. 2d at 870, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 471 (citation omitted); see generally Question of Law,
supra note 12.
2Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) was enacted primar-
ily to abolish the common-law writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. Prior to enact-
ment of article 78, a party would lose his claim if the wrong form was chosen. N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAw § 7801 (McKinney 1977) combines these forms to allow proceedings without special
designations.
Limitations on judicial review are specified within CPLR § 7801. Thus, no judicial review
is permitted unless the agency's decision is final and all other remedies have been exhausted.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7801 (McKinney 1977); see, e.g., Cormier v. Mosbacher, 80 Misc. 2d
172, 363 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974). See generally J. WEiNSTEm, H. KoRN
& A. MILLER, NEW YoRK Crvir PRAccE 7801.04-.06 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NEw
YoRK Civm PRACTicE]; Weintraub, Statutory Procedures Governing Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Action: From State Writs to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 38
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 86 (1963); see also State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 324 N.E.2d 351, 364
N.Y.S.2d 879 (1975).
The standard procedure in an article 78 action requires the action to be brought in the
Supreme Court of appropriate jurisdiction. Petition, answer, and reply are filed and a trial
results if there is a dispute over the facts. If the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, the
action is transferred to the Appellate Division. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7804 (McKinney
1977); see Id., commentary at 181 (McKinney 1977).
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7803 (McKinney 1977).
" See Older v. Board of Educ., 27 N.Y.2d 333, 266 N.E.2d 812, 318 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1971);
Borek v. Tora, 56 App. Div. 2d 727, 392 N.Y.S.2d 762 (4th Dep't 1977); Rozakis v. Beame,
54 App. Div. 2d 399, 388 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1st Dep't 1976).
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dicatory process does not include a hearing because one is not man-
dated by statute or due process, then the "arbitrary and capricious"
test should be utilized. 5 Both standards are used to evaluate the
substantive validity of an agency decision.
The distinction between the two standards is clear. The
"substantial evidence" test calls for a more probing review of the
agency determination because the court has before it a more com-
plete record." Thus, it may be concluded that where the law re-
quires a hearing there is less latitude in the exercise of discretion on
the part of an administrative body and its decision must be more
carefully justified by factual findings. Where the administrative
agency has a wider range of discretion the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" or "rational basis" test serves as a judicial control on the
exercise of that discretion. The result of this distinction is that an
administrative decision which does not satisfy the "arbitrary and
capricious" test a fortiori will not meet the requirements of the
"substantial evidence" test. Unfortunately, the relationship be-
The "substantial evidence" test was first promulgated by the New York Court of Appeals
in Stork Restaurant Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 26 N.E.2d 247 (1940), and conclusively
affirmed in Miller v. Kling, 291 N.Y. 65, 50 N.E.2d 546 (1943).
Some courts use a "clearly erroneous" test. See, e.g., People v. Chapman, 274 App. Div.
715, 87 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1949). There is general agreement among commentators,
however, that there is little substantive difference between this test and the "substantial
evidence" test. See Cooper, Judicial Review, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1375 (1955); Schwartz,
Administrative Justice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1390 (1955).
"1 See, e.g., Pasta Chef, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 54 App. Div. 2d 1112, 389 N.Y.S.2d
72 (4th Dep't 1976); Rochester Colony, Inc. v. Hostetter, 19 App. Div. 2d 250, 241 N.Y.S.2d
210 (4th Dep't 1963) (judicial review of administrative action not based solely on evidence in
the record involves the question whether action is arbitrary and capricious).
Under either the "arbitrary and capricious" or the "substantial evidence" test, the courts
are primarily concerned with whether there is a rational basis for the decision. See Pell v.
Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 313 N.E.2d 321, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1974); 125 Bar Corp. v.
State Liquor Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 174, 247 N.E.2d 157, 299 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1969); Sag Harbor
Union Free School Dist. v Helsby, 54 App. Div. 2d 391, 388 N.Y.S.2d 695 (3d Dep't 1976).
These tests are the administrative equivalent of sufficiency of evidence requirements in
the trial context. Just as the question whether a party has met his burden of proof always
presents a question of law, similarly whether an agency determination is founded upon sub-
stantial evidence or alternatively, if there has been no hearing, is not arbitrary and capricious,
always presents a question of law for the reviewing court.
49 See note 44 supra. It should be noted that although more agency discretion is allowed
under the "arbitrary and capricious" test, judicial review is broader since it is not limited to
the record and a trial de novo as to the factual issues is permitted. See, e.g., Mandle v. Brown,
5 N.Y.2d 51, 152 N.E.2d 511, 177 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1958); In re Caristo Constr. Corp., 30 Misc.
2d 185, 221 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), modified sub nom. Caristo Constr. Corp.
v. Rubin, 15 App. Div. 2d 566, 222 N.Y.S.2d 998 (2d Dep't 1961), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 538, 180
N.E.2d 794, 225 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1962); see Masder Builders, Inc. v. Overton, 15 App. Div. 2d
551, 223 N.Y.S.2d 174 (2d Dep't 1961). See generally Administrative Process, supra note 10,
at 45.
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tween the two standards has often led to a blurring of the distinction
between them in court opinions.47
Application of the Dual Standard to State Administrative Agencies
The "substantial evidence" test and the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" test are the primary standards applied by New York courts
when reviewing administrative adjudications. While these stan-
dards appear simple on their face, their application is complicated
where the agency itself has internal review procedures. The inter-
play of agency and judicial review can best be seen through an
examination of the adjudicatory process of the New York State
Human Rights Commission.
Pursuant to the New York Human Rights Law, as embodied in
the New York Executive Law,4" complaints alleging discriminatory
practices are filed with the State Division of Human Rights, which
decides whether there is "probable cause" to believe that the alleged
discriminatory practice is occurring." If the state division, makes a
finding of no probable cause, the complaint is dismissed. If probable
cause is found and a conciliation agreement cannot be reached, the
state division is empowered to conduct a hearing." Any determina-
tion of the state division may be appealed to the Human Rights
Appeal Board which utilizes a dual standard of review similar to
that enunciated in CPLR § 7803.51 Thus, the appeal board applies
," An example of the way in which courts have failed to differentiate between the two
tests is the case of Conley v. Zoning Board, 40 N.Y.2d 309, 353 N.E.2d 594, 386 N.Y.S.2d
681 (1976). In Conley, the New York Court of Appeals, finding substantial evidence in the
record, concluded that the issuance of a zoning variance could not be considered arbitrary or
capricious. Id. at 316, 353 N.E.2d at 597, 386 N.Y.S.2d 685. The blurring of these tests is due
to a more fundamental difficulty in determining which acts are considered administrative
functions. For example, if agency action is determined to be administrative the court may
only review on the basis of whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious. Conversely, a
reviewing court must apply the "substantial evidence" test upon a determination that the
agency action was judicial in nature. See notes 52 & 54 and accompanying text infra.
N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1977-1978).
Section 297 of the New York Executive Law provides that "[w]ithin fifteen days after
a complaint is filed, the division shall determine whether it has jurisdiction and, if so, whether
there is probable cause to believe that the person named in the complaint, . . . has engaged
• . . in an unlawful discriminatory practice." N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 297(2) (McKinney 1977).
0 Id.
5, Id. § 297-a(7) (McKinney 1977). The Human Rights Appeal Board may
affirm, remand or reverse any order of the division or remand the matter to the
division for further proceedings'. . . provided, however, that the board shall limit
its review to whether the order of the division is:
d. supported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or
e. not arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
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the "substantial evidence" test when a hearing precedes the state
division decision 52 and the "arbitrary and capricious" test where
there is an initial finding of no probable cause. 3 Judicial review of
appeal board decisions is specifically authorized by section 298 of
the New York Executive Law54 and may also be pursued under
article 78. Although section 298 does not specify the scope of judicial
review, the article 78 dual standard clearly controls.5
The relationship between internal appeal board review of a
division decision and judicial review of the appeal board's action is
illustrated by the decision in State Division of Human Rights v.
Columbia University." The case involved a complaint that Colum-
bia University had been guilty of gender-based discrimination in
rejecting the complainant's application for a tenured appointment
in the University's Department of Psychology. Following a hearing,
the state division found that Columbia University had not engaged
in any discriminatory practices. The appeal board overturned the
state division's determination on the basis of a different view of the
facts and of the weight of the evidence. In particular, the appeal
board held that the state division's "restrictive designation" of the
complainant's area of specialization was "against the weight of the
evidence."5 The appeal board relied heavily on the bare "statistical
fact" that far fewer women than men held tenured positions on the
university's faculty. 8
The division shall be bound by the decision of the board ....
Id.; see note 42 supra.
52 N.Y. Exnc. LAw § 297(4) (McKinney 1977); see, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 48 App. Div. 2d 391, 370 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1st Dep't
1975)(per curiam)(appeal board cannot set aside findings due to conflicting evidence); Artis
v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 42 App. Div. 2d 557, 345 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't
1973)(per curiam)(court erred in proceeding beyond ruling on the substantiality of the evi-
dence).
53 See, e.g., Heron v. Albany Law School, 57 App. Div. 2d 672, 393 N.Y.S.2d 617 (3d
Dep't 1977)(mem.); Eastman Kodak Co. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 44 App. Div. 2d 888,
355 N.Y.S.2d 676 (4th Dep't 1974) (mem.); State Div. of Human Rights v. Buffalo Auto Glass
Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 678, 344 N.Y.S.2d 374 (4th Dep't 1973).
" N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 298 (McKinney 1977). Section 298 provides for judicial review of
appeal board decisions and specifies that the "findings of fact" on which an appeal board
order is based "shall be conclusive if supported by sufficient evidence on the record consid-
ered as a whole." Id.
51 See, e.g., Mize v. State Div. of Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d 53, 304 N.E.2d 231, 349
N.Y.S.2d 364 (1973); Kowalski v. Nassau County Bd. of Supervisors, 57 App. Div. 2d 858,
394 N.Y.S.2d 263 (2d Dep't 1977).
39 N.Y.2d 612, 350 N.E.2d 396, 385 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1976).
Id. at 616, 350 N.E.2d at 398, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 21. The appeal board also found that
petitioner had repeatedly sought employment at Columbia University and that recent deaths
had opened faculty positions in the school.
" Id. at 619, 350 N.E.2d at 400, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 22. The New York Court of Appeals
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As the provisions of the statute indicate, the Human Rights
Law places the appeal board in essentially the same position as a
nisi prius reviewing court in an article 78 proceeding. 9 Thus, where
there has been a hearing at the state division, the appeal board may
not reverse a determination that is supported by substantial evi-
dence and thus substitute its own view of the weight of the evidence
for that of the state division. This holds true even if there is substan-
tial evidence to support a position adverse to the decision reached
by the state division. 0 It was this statutory restriction upon appeal
board action that led the New York Court of Appeals to annul the
determination of the Columbia University appeal board. In order to
reverse, therefore, the court first had to be convinced that substan-
tial evidence supported the initial decision of the State Division."
The court's function in a situation, such as that presented in
Columbia University, where the appeal board reverses a state divi-
sion determination is somewhat paradoxical. While the appeal
board decision may be based on "substantial evidence," it still may
have exceeded its statutory power in substituting its view of the
facts for that of the division. 2 Furthermore, the reviewing court is
not permitted to adopt the appeal board's conclusions merely be-
cause it agrees with the latter's view of the weight of the evidence.
Rather, the court must look to the state division's decision and de-
cide whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence. 3
n Columbia University, the appeal board had not controverted the
findings concerning the adverse financial situation at Columbia
University and the resultant restriction on tenured appointments in
had previously held in Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, 339
N.E.2d 880, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975), that "a statistical predicate alone, especially where
there are complicating historical reasons for a statistical bias, will not support a challenge to
the employer's employment practices . . . ." Id. at 36, 339 N.E.2d at 888, 377 N.Y.S.2d at
476 (citation omitted). For a discussion of the use of statistics in discrimination actions, see
Hallock, The Numbers Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation,
23 VmL. L. REv. 5 (1977).
" See note 54 supra.
" See notes 42 & 44 supra. Where the appeal board substitutes its own view of the facts,
even if supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must annul the appeal board's
decision and reinstate the state division's findings of fact provided they are supported by
substantial evidence on the record. See, e.g., Artis v. State Div. of Human Rights, 42 App.
Div. 2d 557, 345 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't 1973)(per curiam).
11 39 N.Y.2d at 616, 350 N.E.2d at 398, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 21; see Mize v. State Div. of
Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d 52, 304 N.E.2d 231, 349 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1973); New York Inst. of
Tech. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 48 App. Div. 2d 132, 368 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1st Dep't
1975) (per curiam); Long Island R.R. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 42 App. Div. 2d 857,
346 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't 1973).
82 See notes 52-53 supra.
'3 See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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the psychology department. 4 It was this evidence, as well as the
evidence supporting the state division's determination of Colum-
bia's lack of need for a tenured appointment in the complainant's
area of expertise that persuaded the court to annul the appeal board
determination. 5 Thus, Columbia University illustrates the interac-
tion between the standard of judicial review and the nature of the
agency's factfinding process. An appreciation of this relationship is
important since the scope of judicial review of an agency's ultimate
determination is often dictated by the method of fact finding uti-
lized by the agency.
JuDicin REVIEW OF SUPERVENING QUESTIONS OF LAW
This Article will now discuss a firmly established area of judi-
cial concern: review of "pure" questions of law. The first portion of
the Article sought to analyze and achieve an understanding of the
distinction between law and fact and the control that a reviewing
court exercises over the making of legal inferences, findings of facts,
and ultimate determinations. Now the discussion turns to an exami-
nation of those areas which are distinctly within the province of
judicial review, into which a court will intrude without hesitation.
Challenges to administrative adjudication based on "pure"
questions of law may be segregated into four general catagories: (a)
constitutional challenges;6 (b) statutory challenges claiming, for
example, that the agency has acted in excess of the power conferred
upon it by the Legislature;67 (c) challenges to agency regulations;"
and (d) challenges to penalties imposed or remedies granted by an
agency." These categories, while well defined, may usually be dis-
tinguished from the question of the quantitative or evidentiary ade-
quacy of an agency decision, but are in some cases related to the
question of the substantiality of the underlying factual basis for the
decision."
Constitutional Challenges
A threshold question which may be raised is whether an
agency's adjudicatory procedure violates constitutional standards of
See note 56 supra.
39 N.Y.2d at 617-18, 350 N.E. 2d at 398, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
S See notes 71-106 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 107-142 and accompanying text infra.
" See notes 143-149 and accompanying text infra.
" See notes 151-167 and accompanying text infra.
70 See notes 116, 146, 150-153, 162 and accompanying text infra.
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due process.7 This challenge is advanced when the agency adjudi-
cates a dispute or a claim without affording the aggrieved party an
opportunity to be heard.7 2 In these cases, courts have held that an
administrative determination may be challenged on the ground that
due process rights were violated.73 Such claims, however, are not
often raised when an agency's adjudicatory procedures are clearly
defined by statute because where statutory rights are created, a
hearing is usually statutorily mandated.7 4 In addition, a hearing
requirement may be imposed, even if not statutorily mandated,
when an aggrieved party can demonstrate that the interest which
he seeks to protect constitutes a "property right" under prevailing
authority.7
1, The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides that "[no] . . . State
[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or, property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
The constitutional guarantee of due process mandates "that the law shall not be unrea-
sonable, arbitrary or capricious." Nebbia v. State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524-25 (1934).
Compliance with due process would require an orderly proceeding in accordance with the law
during which a person has the opportunity to be heard and to enforce his rights. In re Coates,
9 N.Y.2d 242, 173 N.E.2d 797, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1961).
72 Under article 78, an agency action may be characterized as "judicial" or
"administrative." NEW YORK CIVIL PACTICE, supra note 42, at $ 7803.07; see note 5 supra.
For example, it has been held that the revocation of a press pass, New York Evening Enquirer,
Inc. v. Kennedy, 18 Misc. 2d 950, 162 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957), the issuance
of a building demolition order, Janks v. Syracuse, 47 Misc.2d 718, 263 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1965), and the barring of a taxi driver from an airport, Bohrer v.
Murphy, 31 Misc. 2d 1084, 223 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup Ct. N.Y. County 1961), were judicial
determinations and accordingly should be preceded by a hearing. See generally 18 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 203 (1966); 14 SYRAcusE L. Rlv. 178 (1962). An administrative agency is not required
to afford a petitioner a hearing which would satisfy the constitutional standards of due
process unless the action is determined to be judicial in nature. NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE,
supra note 42, at 7803.04. Even absent a specific statutory requirement, an adversary
hearing will be implied where official agency action is characterized as judicial. See, e.g.,
Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954), wherein the court held that
although the bureau empowered to regulate licensing of taxi drivers is not required by statute
to afford a hearing, where the judicial agency action adversely affects property rights a
hearing requirement will be implied.
13 See, e.g., New York Evening Enquirer v. Kennedy, 18 Misc. 2d 950, 162 N.Y.S.2d 530
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957). A party aggrieved by governmental agency action has a consti-
tutional right to a "'trial type hearing'" on issues of adjudicatory fact. Peninsula Gen.
Nursing Home v. Sugarman, 57 App. Div. 2d 268, 273, 394 N.Y.S.2d 644, 648 (1st Dep't
1977) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). Although administrative hearings
need not comply with technical rules of evidence, see notes 102-103 infra, the essential
elements of a fair trial must be present. Kaplan v. Kinzler, 77 Misc. 2d 507, 353 N.Y.S.2d
643 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974).
14 E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1977-1978). Claims arising
under the Social Services Law typically relate to whether the agency acted unreasonably in
denying or reducing a recipient's benefits. See, e.g., Dumbleton v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 586, 357
N.E.2d 363, 388 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1976); Hagood v. Berger, 52 App. Div. 2d 584, 382 N.Y.S.2d
537 (2d Dep't 1976); notes 99-106, 123-133 and accompanying text infra.
11 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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In Buschmann v. United New York Sandy Hook Pilots
Association76 the court illustrated how controlling constitutional
principles are to be applied by the courts to the administrative
adjudicatory process, particularly when the agency is not subject to
a clear statutory directive." The administrative entity in
Buschmann was the Board of Commissioners of Pilots, a body cre-
ated by section 87 of the New York Navigation Law and charged
with the supervision of a legislatively sanctioned 4-year apprentice-
ship program for harbor pilots." Additionally, the Sandy Hook Pil-
ots Association conducts a 31/2-year training program which culmi-
nates in appointment to the apprenticeship program. 71 Individuals
appointed to the apprenticeship program are concededly entitled to,
prior to discharge from the program, the procedural safeguards af-
forded to "any. . .person connected with a pilot boat" by sections
94(4) and 94(5) of the Navigation Law."0 The Appellate Division
7- 38 N.Y.2d 774, 345 N.E.2d 337, 381 N.Y.S.2d 865, rev'g mem. 46 App. Div. 2d 391,
362 N.Y.S.2d 556 (2d Dep't 1975).
7 See note 74 and accompanying text supra; note 80 and accompanying text infra.
78 Section 90 of the New York Navigation Law provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the rules and regulations of the board of commissioners, the executive
committee of the United New York Sandy Hook Pilots Benevolent Association...
shall have sole control over 11 apprentices and be charged with the responsibility
to instruct such apprentices in their duties as Sandy Hook pilots. No other appren-
ticeship shall be accepted by the commissioners.
N.Y. NAy. LAW § 90 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
" The initial 3V2-year program is known as a "pre-apprenticeship" or "applicant ap-
prentice" program which is neither mandated nor authorized by statute. 46 App. Div. 2d 391,
392, 362 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558.
90 Id. at 393, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 559 (quoting N.Y. N"y. LAW § 94(4) (McKinney Supp. 1977-
1978)). Sections 94(4) and 94(5) provide:
4. It shall be the duty of the commissioners to hear and examine all com-
plaints duly made in writing against any pilot or person connected with a pilot boat,
for any misbehavior or neglect of duty, or breach of their rules or regulations, which
they shall deem material to be investigated. They shall also hear and examine all
complaints made in like manner by any licensed pilot against any master, owner,
or seaman of a vessel, for any misbehavior toward such pilot in the performance of
his duty, or any breach of such rules or regulations.
5. Before any person shall be proceeded against on any complaint, and before
any pilot may be removed or suspended for longer than one month, such person or
pilot shall be notified in writing, signed by the secretary, to appear before the board
of commissioners. Such notice, which shall specify the nature and substance of such
complaint, shall be served personally at least five days before the time fixed for
appearance. The commissioners shall postpone or adjourn such hearing from time
to time for just cause. The certificate of such commissioners, or of a majority of
them, with proof of such service of notice, shall be prima facie evidence that the
party upon whom the notice was served, and upon whom a fine or penalty was
thereupon imposed, is liable to pay such fine or penalty.
Id. §§ 94(4)-(5).
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held, however, that where an individual is discharged from the pre-
apprenticeship program without a hearing on the "ground that his
continued participation in the training program was not in the best
interest of the pilots," there is no due process violation."1
The New York Court of Appeals in Buschmann adopted the
opinion of the dissenting justice in the Appellate Division who took
the position that individuals participating in the 31/2-year "pre-
apprenticeship" program were entitled to procedural due process
protection.8 2 It was reasoned that, since the so-called pre-
apprenticeship program was a mandatory prerequisite for admission
to apprenticeship training, the respondents Board of Commissioners
of Pilots and Benevolent Association had, in effect, extended the
apprenticeship training program from the statutorily required 4-
year period to 71/2 years.1 The pre-apprenticeship program, there-
fore, resulted in the creation of additional licensing requirements for
pilots which were insulated from the due process benefits conferred
by section 94 of the Navigation Law. This exclusion, whether or not
intended, could not prevent a court from concluding that a "pre-
apprentice's" expectancy of appointment to the apprenticeship pro-
gram and eventual license as a pilot was a sufficiently cognizable
"property right" to trigger the application of the due process
clause. 4 Thus, it may be seen that the notice and hearing require-
ments which flow from the federal and state constitutions may be
invoked to bar summary administrative action resulting in the loss
of an expectancy of continued employment.
In confronting challenges to administrative adjudications
based on asserted procedural due process violations, the courts often
9, 46 App. Div. 2d at 394,362 N.Y.S.2d at 560. The Appellate Division majority reasoned:
The availability of the procedural safeguards provided in the statute is limited to
those persos who are connected in some statutorily-recognized manner with the
pilotage service. Despite his enrollment in the pre-apprenticeship program, the
petitioner was quite clearly not an apprentice within the statutory framework and
not within the categories covered by the statute.
Id. at 393, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
92 38 N.Y.2d 774, 774, 345 N.E.2d 337, 337, 381 N.Y.S.2d 865, 865, rev'g 46 App. Div. 2d
391, 362 N.Y.S.2d 556 (2d Dep't 1975).
Regarding the "pre-apprenticeship" program, Justice Shapiro, authoring the dissent in
the Appellate Division, stated:
Realistically .... it must be concluded that the 3-1/2 year pre-apprenticeship
training course is a de facto prerequisite to participation in the four-year apprentice
program provided by section 90 of the Navigation law, and hence to eventual
licensure as a harbor pilot by the Board of Commissioners of Pilots.
Id. at 396, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
3Id.
Id. at 395-96, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
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eschew strong reliance on constitutional principles if there is an
alternative basis for decision. This is consistent with the general
trend to avoid deciding questions on constitutional grounds when
possible.u Two cases manifesting this judicial proclivity are White
Plains Nursing Home v. Whalen"5 and Hagood v. Berger.7
In White Plains Nursing Home the Commissioner of Health
reduced the medicaid reimbursement rate for the petitioner nursing
home on the basis of his determination that the lease between the
nursing home and its lessor was not entered into at arms length.8
Pursuant to regulation providing that the commissioner may alter
the medicaid reimbursement rate to reflect the true cost of renting
premises, the rate was retroactively and prospectively reduced to
enable the department to recoup alleged overpayments to the nurs-
ing home. 9 No hearing was held prior to this determination nor was
any mandated by statute or departmental regulation. Rather, the
agency was ostensibly exercising a ratemaking function which has
traditionally been viewed by the courts as quasi-legislative rather
than adjudicatory or quasi-judicial.
The trial court, concluding that the commissioner's determina-
tion was not supported by substantial evidence, remitted the matter
"for further proceedings and determination."'" The Appellate Divi-
sion affirmed, essentially on due process grounds, reasoning that
while there was no property right in prospective medicaid reim-
bursement rates, there was a sufficient property right in the alleged
overpayments sought to be recouped.2 The court held, however,
that the hearing should inquire into both past payments and pro-
" See, e.g., Peters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954);
Schieffelin v. Goldsmith, 253 N.Y. 243, 170 N.E. 905 (1930).
42 N.Y.2d 838, 366 N.E.2d 79, 397 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1977) (mere.).
- 42 N.Y.2d 901, 366 N.E.2d 1345, 397 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1977)(mem.).
42 N.Y.2d 838, 838, 366 N.E.2d 79, 80, 397 N.Y.S.2d 378, 379 (1977) (mem.).
0 Id. at 839, 366 N.E.2d at 80, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 379 (1977). [1977] 10 N.Y.C.R.R. § 86-
2.7 provides for a hearing, initiated by the health care facility, so that the petitioner may
present and refute evidence that would adversely affect its interests in the event the proposed
rate revision takes effect.
10 See, e.g., Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Pink, 288 N.Y. 259, 43 N.E.2d 442 (1942);
Town Bd. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 22 App. Div. 2d 270, 255 N.Y.S.2d 549 (2d Dep't 1964).
Rate fixing normally may not be judicially reviewed in an article 78 proceeding. See Southern
Dutchess Country Club v. Town Bd., 18 N.Y.2d 870, 222 N.E.2d 739, 276 N.Y.S.2d 121
(1966); Neddo v. Schrade, 270 N.Y. 97, 200 N.E. 657 (1936). However, it has been held that
where notice and a hearing are statutorily mandated, ratemaking is more properly a
"judicial" function and accordingly may be reviewed. See People ex reL Consolidated Water
Co. v. Maltie, 275 N.Y. 357, 9 N.E.2d 961 (1937); People ex rel. Central Park, N.&E. R.R. v.
Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 383, 87 N.E. 517 (1909).
,1 53 App. Div. 2d 926, 927, 385 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393 (3d Dep't 1976) (mem.).
92 Id., 385 N.Y.S.2d at 393-94.
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spective reimbursement rates so that there would be an adequate
record for review.93
The New York Court of Appeals, agreeing with the lower courts,
held that the case should be remanded,94 observing that
"substantial interests" of the petitioner were at stake, making a
hearing appropriate.95 The Court of Appeals in White Plains Nurs-
ing Home avoided reliance upon the constitutional implications of
the case. However, it is clear that, if a property right were not at
stake, a hearing would not have been required by the court. Strictly
speaking, where a hearing is not statutorily provided and the agency
is acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" test rather than the "substantial evidence" test is applica-
ble.9" Nevertheless, all of the courts confronted with the case ap-
peared concerned with the fact that the lack of a hearing and the
specific findings which would flow therefrom would result in a deter-
mination which could not be subject to adequate judicial review.
The lower courts proceeded further, however, partially because pro-
spective rates were at issue, to articulate a substantive view of the
agency's determination, i.e., that the quantum of evidence relied
upon by the commissioner to sustain his ultimate determination
was not substantial.97 Because of the nature of the problem, the
Court of Appeals carefully avoided reference to the applicable stan-
dard of review or the constitutional issue. Involved were past reim-
bursement rates, a property right, as well as prospective rates,
which obviously affected petitioner but did not in themselves trigger
93 Id., 385 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
14 42 N.Y.2d 838, 840, 366 N.E.2d 79, 80, 397 N.Y.S.2d 378, 379 (1977)(mem.). The
Appellate Division had concluded that the commissioner's "determination was not supported
by substantial evidence" and remitted the matter for "proper proceedings and determina-
tion." 53 App. Div. 2d 926, 927, 385 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393 (3d Dep't 1976)(mem.). The Appellate
Division affirmed essentially on due process grounds, reasoning that while there was no
property right in prospective medicaid reimbursement rates, there was a sufficient property
right in alleged past overpayments which the nursing home had expected and received. Id.
The court, however, did not limit the hearing to the question of recoupment of past overpay-
ments but held further that a hearing was required in order to establish an adequate record
for review of the determination as to the prospective reimbursement rate as well. Id. The court
felt that the report relied upon by the agency "was not established sufficiently" to enable it
to determine whether the commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Id.
15 42 N.Y.2d at 840, 366 N.E.2d at 80, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 379. The court was particularly
concerned with that portion of the determination that involved a reduction of medicaid
reimbursement rates to allow for compensation of the alleged overpayments already received
by petitioner. Id. It was this portion that the court expressly noted would affect petitioner's
substantial interest, and thus would warrant a hearing. Id.
96 Freitag v. Marsh, 106 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1951), cause transferred, 280 App. Div. 934, 115
N.Y.S.2d 838 (1952).
11 53 App. Div. 2d at 927, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
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procedural due process rights. If the court had required a hearing
to adjudicate the contested factual issue only with respect to past
reimbursement rates, an inconsistency in reasoning and perhaps in
result would have occurred: different standards of review would
have been applied, with perhaps different outcomes, to the same
determination of ultimate fact.9"
Another case in which the Court of Appeals avoided adoption
of a broad constitutional ratio decidendi is Hagood v. Berger.9
Hagood arose under the New York Social Services Law which man-
dates a "fair hearing" before the denial of welfare benefits.' The
problem presented in the case illustrates the often close relationship
between the due process issue and the question of the quantitative
adequacy of the evidence supporting an agency decision.
The State Department of Social Services sought to discontinue
welfare assistance to petitioner and her four children on the ground
that she willfully concealed that her husband was fully employed
and resided in the household.10' All of the evidence addressed by the
1 It is clear that when there is deprivation of a property right, a hearing is required.
However, had the White Plains Nursing Home court required a hearing to examine the past
reimbursement rates only, subsequently, the reviewing court would apply the "substantial
evidence" test to the determination regarding past rates and the "arbitrary and capricious"
test to the administrative decision regarding prospective rates.
42 N.Y.2d 901, 366 N.E.2d 1345, 397 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1977) (mem.).
' The New York Social Services Law provides that any person making an application
for medical assistance may appeal to the Department of Social Services for a hearing in the
event such application is denied or is not acted upon within 30 days after filing or if the
applicant claims that the assistance granted is inadequate. N.Y. Soc. SEr. LAW § 366-a
(McKinney 1976). The "fair hearing," however, is not an adversary proceeding. Henegar v.
Wyman, 63 Misc. 2d 688, 313 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Sup. Ct. Greene County 1970). The agency is
under no obligation to advise petitioner of his legal rights, nor will the proceedings be an-
nulled if petitioner is without representation by counsel. Id.
"1i 42 N.Y.2d at 902, 366 N.E.2d at 1346, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 992. The department's action
against petitioner was triggered by a telephone call from an anonymous informant who did
not testify at the hearing. Id. at 902, 366 N.E.2d at 1345, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 992. The proof
offered by the department at the hearing was entirely documentary and was introduced by
an agency representative who was not personally familiar with the facts. The evidence consis-
ted of a lease of the apartment in which petitioner lived, prepared in the names of petitioner
and her husband. The tenant's copy of the lease, however, the only copy produced at the
hearing, was signed by the petitioner alone. Id. at 903, 366 N.E.2d at 1346, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
992. On a form request for information from the department to the husband's employer, the
latter reported that the husband claimed six exemptions for tax purposes and gave his address
as the home in which petitioner, her husband, and children lived before peititoner moved into
public housing. Another form requesting information from postal authorities revealed, with-
out identification of the source, that mail addressed to petitioner's husband was being deliv-
ered to her apartment. Id., 366 N.E.2d at 1346, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
In response to the agency's proof, petitioner testified that although her husband accom-
panied her to the management offices of the housing authority when she applied for an
apartment, he had never lived with the family there and she had informed the housing
authority of this fact when she moved in. Petitioner also stated that the only mail received
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agency consisted of hearsay; no agency personnel or other persons
with personal knowledge of the facts were summoned as witnesses
for the agency. It is well settled that administrative agencies are not
bound by the rules governing evidence admissible in court and may
consider and rely upon hearsay in their adjudications. 0 2 However,
in a number of decisions involving the same issue and the same
scarcity of record proof, it has been held that reliance only upon
such hearsay proof "does not even approach minimum standards of
fairness."103 Therefore, the case is troubling from the standpoint of
fairness, which is at the foundation of the due process guarantee."'
Conversely, the investigatory problem for the agency in ascertaining
whether individuals receiving welfare assistance are fraudulently
concealing sources of income presents a difficult and practical prob-
lem. Disturbed by the unfairness of the hearing afforded petitioner,
yet reluctant to establish a constitutional precedent which would
pose severe difficulties for an agency charged with disbursing a lim-
ited amount of public funds, the Court of Appeals chose a middle
ground. '"5 Basing its decision on "substantial evidence" grounds,
the court ordered a new hearing, thus allowing the agency to under-
take a more thorough investigation to assure that no unfairness
would result to the petitioner."'6 Once again, therefore, the reluct-
ance of the courts to utilize constitutional grounds in disposing of
challenges to administrative determinations is illustrated.
at her address for her husband were insurance premium notices on an insurance policy
naming petitioner and the children as beneficiaries. Id., 366 N.E.2d at 1347, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
933.
,02 Scarpitta v. Glen Cove Hous. Auth., 48 App. Div. 2d 647, 367 N.Y.S.2d 542 (2d Dep't
1975) (mem.) (hearsay admissible in administrative proceeding, but, in some instances, such
evidence would result in unfair hearing); see Erdman v. Ingraham, 28 App. Div. 2d 5, 280
N.Y.S.2d 865 (1st Dep't 1967) (hearsay evidence cannot be utilized to "deprive a party of the
right to a fair hearing where that right is guaranteed by law"); W. RICHARDSON, EviDNacE §
208 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
103 Del Valle v. Sugarman, 44 App. Div. 2d 523, 524, 353 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (1st Dep't
1974) (per curiam); Augistine v. Berger, 88 Misc. 2d 487, 388 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1976) (although an administrative hearing need not comply with all of the rules of
evidence, hearsay alone is insufficient evidence upon which to base an administrative deter-
mination).
"04 See Buder v. Bell, 306 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Mishkin v.
Thomas, 282 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Bagley v. Bagley, 57 Misc. 2d 388, 292 N.Y.S.2d
796 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).
"I Petitioner initially sought to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals as of right on
the constitutional grounds, but the appeal was dismissed on the ground that no substantial
constitutional question was presented. 39 N.Y.2d 1057, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1976). However,
the court later granted petitioner's motion for leave to appeal, 40 N.Y.2d 804, 387 N.Y.S.2d
1032 (1976), and ultimately reversed the Appellate Division decision which had upheld the
administrative agency's decision to discontinue petitioner's benefits. 42 N.Y.2d 901, 366
N.E.2d 1345, 397 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1977).
1" 42 N:Y.2d at 905, 366 N.E.2d at 1347, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
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Statutory Challenges
A frequently asserted challenge to administrative adjudication
is that the agency has acted in excess of the power conferred upon
it by the Legislature. This contention usually involves a challenge
to the agency's interpretation of its governing statute and thus pres-
ents a question of statutory construction for the courts."' Even
though an agency decision is based upon substantial evidence or is
not arbitrary and capricious, it may nonetheless be assailable if the
agency has acted beyond its statutory authority. The courts, there-
fore, exercise general control over the authority asserted by adminis-
trative agencies, assuring that the latter do not exceed their legisla-
tive mandates or act in derogation of the power conferred thereby."'
A court's interpretation of the nature and, particularly, the extent
of the legislative mandate may be contrary to that of the adminis-
trative agency. 09 In that case, of course, it is always the judicial view
which prevails. Thus, for example, in an article 78 proceeding, the
CPLR provides that a petitioner may raise the question "whether
the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to proceed
without or in excess of jurisdiction."'10
Illustrative of a case squarely raising this type of claim is New
York Times Co. v. City of New York Commission on Human
Rights. "I In this case, the City Commission on Human Rights found
that the New York Times aided and abetted discriminatory employ-
ment practices by publishing advertisements for employment op-
portunities in South Africa."2 The advertisements, which were for
managerial positions in corporations and faculty appointments in
South African universities, were not racially discriminatory on their
face. The anti-discrimination provisions of the New York City Ad-
ministrative Code prohibit employers or employment agencies from
printing or causing to be printed any statement, advertisement or
publication which "expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation,
specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed, color, national
origin or sex or any intent to make such limitation, specification or
W07 See, e.g., Dumbleton v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 586, 357 N.E.2d 363, 388 N.Y.S.2d 893
(1976); notes 123-133 and accompanying text infra.
' See, e.g., Reyes v. Dumpson, 40 N.Y.2d 725, 358 N.E.2d 510, 389 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1976).
" See, e.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board,
41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976); notes 119-122 and accompanying text
infra.
0 N.Y. Cwr. PRAc. LAw § 7803 (McKinney 1977).
[i 41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1977).
11 Id. at 347, 361 N.E.2d at 965, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
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discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation. 113 It is similarly unlawful for any person to "aid, abet, in-
cite, compel or cause the doing of any acts forbidden" by the anti-
discrimination law.114 The New York Times successfully challenged
the commission's determination in the lower courts on the ground
that the commission was without jurisdiction to intrude into activi-
ties conducted in foreign countries. 15
In the New York Court of Appeals the commission maintained
that the courts were limited in their review to determining whether
there was substantial evidence to support its decision. The majority
of the court disagreed and clearly delineated the nature and scope
of its review, stating that "it would be both wrong and inappropriate
to apply the 'substantial evidence test.' The issue is simply whether
the commission properly analyzed the law and we hold that it did
not.""' 6 The majority concluded that as a matter of law the New
York Times' advertisements contained no expression prohibited by
the Administrative Code provisions either directly or by implication
and, therefore, that the New York Times had not violated the anti-
discrimination provision by printing the advertisements.1 7 There
was no use of "code words" or other subterfuge to circumvent the
purpose of the code. In essence, the majority rejected the notion that
the mere use of the geographical reference "South African" was per
se discriminatory."'
113 NEW YoRK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 1, § B1-7.0, subd. 1, par. [d] (1976).
"I Id. at subd. 6. Following the filing of complaints by several parties, the commission
found probable cause to believe that the New York Times aided in a discriminatory practice
by publishing the advertisements because it knew or should have known of the South African
government's racial policies. 41 N.Y.2d at 347, 361 N.E.2d at 965, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
I's 41 N.Y.2d at 347, 361 N.E.2d at 966, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 314. The commission held a
hearing at which evidence was presented demonstrating that racially discriminatory employ-
ment practices were prevalent in South Africa. The New York Times did not dispute the
evidence and the commission found that no findings of fact were necessary. Id. at 348, 361
N.E.2d at 966, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 314. The commission concluded that the racially discrimina-
tory system of South Africa was widely known and that the very term South Africa denoted
"white supremacy." Id. The New York Times was therefore ordered to cease and desist from
printing the South African employment advertisements. Id., 361 N.E.2d at 965, 393 N.Y.S.2d
at 315.
The trial court set aside the commission's determination, reasoning that jurisdiction did
not extend to activities conducted in foreign countries. Id. The Appellate Division affirmed,
holding that the actual language printed in the New York Times' advertisements did not
"indicate an intent on the part of petitioner to participate in a program of discrimination"
and granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals. 49 App. Div. 2d 851, 374 N.Y.S.2d
9 (1975).
"1 41 N.Y.2d at 349, 361 N.E.2d at 966, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
"7 Id. at 350, 361 N.E.2d at 966, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
[is Id.
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New York Times involved a pure question of statutory con-
struction and the application of a statute to an uncontroverted set
of facts. The "quantity" of the evidence supporting the administra-
tive determination was not at issue. The issue to be resolved was the
extent and reach of the anti-discrimination provisions of the code.
Another recent decision involving the anti-discrimination laws
posed an even more difficult problem of statutory interpretation and
reconciliation. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human
Rights Appeal Board' involved a particularly knotty dilemma of
statutory construction because two statutes appeared to be in direct
conflict. In Brooklyn Union Gas and its companion cases, the
Human Rights Appeal Board concluded that, under the New York
Human Rights Law, the deprivation of disability and sick leave
benefits to women due to pregnancy constituted unlawful discrimi-
nation.'1 Judicial review of the decision of the appeal board was
complicated by a provision in the New York Disability Benefits Law
which stated that any disability "caused by or arising in connection
with a pregnancy" was excepted from the minimum benefits re-
quired by the statute. 2' The courts were thus asked to determine
legislative intent in the face of an apparent conflict between two
statutes. The solution devised by the majority was that the Disabil-
ity Benefits Law established minimum requirements for the provi-
sion of benefits, while the Human Rights Law with its all-embracing
proscription against gender-based employment discrimination evi-
denced a legislative intent to require that employers subject to its
provisions afford the same benefits for pregnancy as for other types
of disabilities. 2'
", 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976).
' Id. at 85-86, 359 N.E.2d at 395, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 886. Section 296 of the Executive Law
provides in pertinent part:
Unlawful discriminatory practices.
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(a) For an employer, . . . because of the age, race, creed, color, national
origin [or] sex . . . of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to
discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such indi-
vidual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 296(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
Applying this statutory mandate, it has consistently been held that treatment of
pregnancy-related disabilities in a manner different from any other medical impairment is
violative of the New York Executive Law. Union Free School Dist. No. 6 v. New York State
Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371, 320 N.E.2d 859, 362 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1974) (proscrip-
tions of New York Executive Law applicable to personnel policies and practices of a school
district); Board of Educ. v. State Division of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 675, 319 N.E.2d 203,
360-N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974).
'"' N.Y. WoRK. CoMP. LAW § 205 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
'2 41 N.Y.2d at 86-87, 359 N.E.2d at 395, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 887. In so reconciling the
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The Brooklyn Union Gas case is an apt illustration of the judi-
cial role in resolving disputes regarding legislative intent. Adminis-
trative agencies charged with the administration and enforcement
of various statutory programs tend to be vigorous advocates of their
statutory mandate and usually do not curtail their perceived statu-
tory authority sua sponte. Thus, it is necessary that the reviewing
court act as the impartial arbiter of disputes relating to the applica-
bility and interpretation of statutes governing an administrative
agency's jurisdiction and mandate.
A further example of a judicial determination of the scope and
applicability of statutory law is Dumbleton v. Reed.' This case-is
of interest because it involves the interplay between federal and
state standards in the area of social services. In Dumbleton, the
local social services department and the State Commission of Social
Services determined that petitioner and his family were ineligible
for medical benefits.2 4 In an article 78 proceeding the petitioner
contended that the agency had erred in including social security or
FICA taxes deducted from his wages as income available to him for
purposes of determining medicaid eligibility.2 5 The agency practice
of including FICA tax deductions as available income for medicaid
eligibility purposes was not codified in any department regulation
but, rather, was the agency's interpretation of the state statutory
standard.' 8 In contrast, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare has issued regulations under the Social Security Act'2
divergent statutory provisions, the majority declined to rely on the doctrine of implied repeal
which requires a strong showing that a subsequently enacted statute was intended to nullify
an earlier enactment. Id. at 87, 359 N.E,2d at 396, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
1- 40 N.Y.2d 586, 357 N.E.2d 363, 388 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1976).
124 Id.
"2 Id. at 588, 357 N.E.2d at 365, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 894. Section 366 of the Social Services
Law provides that the Department of Social Services shall take into account "only such
income and resources, in accordance with federal requirements, as are available to the appli-
cant or recipient" in establishing eligibility standards. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366 (9)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
The federal standards to which the state standards are required to conform are contained
in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970), and regulations of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare.
"I8 Section 352.31 of the regulations of the New York Social Services Department states
that overpayments caused by "a recipient's willful withholding of information concerning his
income, resources or other circumstances which may have affected the amount of public
assistance payment" should be recouped from the individual's present income. [1977] 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.31[d]. In determining the amount of recoupment, the statute also provides
that it "shall be limited on a case-by-case basis so as not to cause undue hardship." Id. at §
352.31[d](4).
127 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). The Social Security Act provides that a state plan for
medical assistance must take into account "only such income and resources as are, as deter-
mined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant
or recipient." Id.
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which require that "with respect to . . . the medically needy, a
State plan must: Provide that only such income and resources as are
actually available will be considered and that income and resources
will be reasonably evaluated." ''r The New York Court of Appeals
majority, focusing on the controlling federal standards, disagreed
with the agency's view of the meaning of "income available. 1 29 The
court recognized that amounts deducted for social security taxes do
not in reality represent income "actually available" to an individ-
ual. The taxes are deducted directly by the employer from the em-
ployee's wages and are never actually possessed by the employee.1 30
Indeed, the interpretation of "income available" given by the Com-
missioner of Social Services might result in the employee never
obtaining or being eligible for benefits under the Social Security
Act.
The dissenting judges contended that the agency's construction
of the state statute was reasonable, especially in light of the failure
on the part of the legislature to expressly exempt FICA taxes from
consideration in determining medicaid eligibility.1 31 Thus, one es-
sential difference between the majority and dissent in Dumbleton
is the rationality of interpreting the state Social Services Law as
requiring the inclusion of FICA taxes as "income available." The
dissent resorted to the general axiom that construction of statutes
by agencies responsible for their administration will usually be up-
held if not "irrational or unreasonable.'1 2 This often cited rule of
reason, however, contains little substantive content and is applied
only if, in fact, the reviewing court perceives the agency's view of
the meaning of the statute as a rational and reasonable interpreta-
tion thereof.131
' 45 C.F.R. § 248-3(b)(1) (1976).
' 40 N.Y.2d at 588, 357 N.E.2d at 365, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 894-95. Thus, the majority
concluded that "reason, fairness, and the plain language of the Federal regulation require that
respondents exclude FICA taxes from an applicant's income in determining eligibility for
medical assistance." Id., 357 N.E.2d at 365, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
"I Id. The court noted that the Internal Revenue Code requires an employer to deduct
FICA taxes directly from an employee's wages, and that failure to do so could result in
criminal and personal liability. Id., 357 N.E.2d at 365, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 894. Therefore, the
court concluded that this lack of control by the employee over these monies should properly
warrant a determination that FICA taxes should be excluded from petitioner's income for the
purpose of medical assistance eligibility. Id. at 588, 357 N.E.2d at 365, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
"I Id. at 589, 357 N.E.2d at 366, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Jones, J., dissenting). Judge Jones
authored the dissent, in which Chief Judge Breitel and Judge Jasen concurred.
132 Id. at 590, 357 N.E.2d at 366, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing
Howard v. Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 271 N.E.2d 528, 529, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (1971));
see, e.g., Martin v. Berger, 55 App. Div. 2d 1030, 391 N.Y.S.2d 499 (4th Dep't 1977)(mem.);
De Long v. Lavine, 48 App. Div. 2d 740, 368 N.Y.S.2d 303 (3d Dep't 1975).
'" See St. Luke's Hosp. Center v. Ingraham, 85 Misc. 2d 588, 381 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup.
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The "rule of reason," applicable in cases of administrative con-
struction of controlling statutes, also obtains in the area of taxation,
despite the greater judicial deference to a taxing authority's deter-
mination. The courts appear willing to afford the taxing authorities
a greater degree of latitude in applying taxing statutes to a specific
set of facts.'34 Thus, the New York Court of Appeals has held that
"[w]here the question is one of a specific application of a broad
statutory term in which the agency administering the statute must
determine it initially, the court's function is limited."'35 However,
the rule of reason ensures that the taxing agency's determination,
not be "erroneous, arbitrary or capricious.' ' 36
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Department of Taxation and
Finance33 exemplifies the instances in which a reviewing court will
defer to the taxing agency's application of a statute to a particular
set of undisputed facts. The decisive issue in this type of case is
whether the facts satisfy certain statutory criteria.
Section 115(a)(8) of the New York Tax Law exempts from the
New York State sales and use tax "[c]ommercial vessels primarily
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and property used by
such vessels.' ' 3 8 Great Lakes commenced an article 78 proceeding
to review the decision of the Department of Taxation and Finance,
rendered after a hearing, that Great Lakes' business operations did
not fall within the exemptive language of the statute. Great Lakes
operated dredges, cranes, scows and other maritime dredging equip-
ment in New York State. While the equipment had been trans-
ported across state lines to the site of dredging operations in New
York, the equipment was utilized at a site within New York where
it was anchored to the harbor or river bed. The primary question in
the case was whether the petitioner's activity in New York was
sufficiently localized to make it subject to taxation in New York.'39
Ct. N.Y. County 1975), affl'd, 52 App. Div. 2d 181, 383 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1st Dep't 1976)(mem.)
(although an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is afforded the greatest weight,
the interpretation must not be arbitrary or unreasonable).
"I See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Department of Taxation and Fin., 39 N.Y.2d
75, 346 N.E.2d 796, 382 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1976); Grace v. New York State Tax Comm., 37 N.Y.2d
193, 332 N.E.2d 886, 371 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1975); Young v. Bragalini, 3 N.Y.2d 602, 148 N.E.2d
143, 170 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1958).
"I Young v. Bragalini, 3 N.Y.2d 602, 605, 148 N.E.2d 143, 145, 170 N.Y.S.2d 805, 807
(1958).
"I Grace v. New York State Tax Comm., 37 N.Y.2d 193, 195-96, 332 N.E.2d 886, 888-
89, 371 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (1975); see notes 132-133 and accompanying text supra.
1- 39 N.Y.2d 75, 346 N.E.2d 796, 382 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1976).
"' N.Y. TAx LAW § 1115(a)(8) (McKinney 1975).
1" A preliminary constitutional issue raised was that imposition of the tax resulted in
an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the United States Constitution, but
[Vol. 52:361
1978] JUDICIAL REVIEW
The court, relying on prior interpretations of "localized activity"
and on the rule articulated in Young v. Bragalini,140 sustained the
agency's conclusion that the exemptive provision was not applicable
to petitioner's business.' The Young rule places the burden upon
the taxpayer to establish entitlement to an exemption where the
taxing agency has made a determination that the exemption does
not apply."'
The element of fairness and the consideration of parallel legal
authority are fundamental ingredients in judicial review of adminis-
trative interpretation and construction of statutes. It therefore ap-
this challenge was swiftly rejected by the court. 39 N.Y.2d at 78, 346 N.E.2d at 797, 382
N.Y.S.2d at 959 (1976).
14 3 N.Y.2d 602, 148 N.E.2d 143, 170 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1958). The court concluded that
although the dredging machinery was movable from one state to another, the "movement is
incidental to the localized activity of dredging." 39 N.Y.2d at 79, 346 N.E.2d at 798, 382
N.Y.S.2d at 960. In so holding, the court noted that it had previously held that general
activities, local and separate from interstate commerce, were subject to local taxation. Id. at
80, 346 N.E.2d at 798-99, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 960-61 (citing Niagara Junc. Ry. v. Creagh, 2 App.
Div. 2d 299, 154 N.Y.S.2d 229 (4th Dep't 1956), affl'd, 3 N.Y.2d 831, 144 N.E.2d 720, 166
N.Y.S.2d 74 (1957)(mem.)).
" 39 N.Y.2d at 79-80, 346 N.E.2d at 798, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
4 3 N.Y.2d at 605, 148 N.E.2d at 145, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 807. There are, however, instan-
ces, albeit rare, where the courts will set aside the unjustified application of a taxing statute.
For example, in Quotron Systems v. Gallman, 39 N.Y.2d 428, 348 N.E.2d 604, 384 N.Y.S.2d
147 (1976), a company which manufactured, installed, and maintained electronic equipment
for the transmission of stock market information sought a declaratory judgment that it was
not subject to a state tax on utility services. Id. at 430, 348 N.E.2d at 605, 384 N.Y.S.2d at
147. The issue presented in Quotron Systems was whether the petitioner should be considered
a company which supplied telegraphic services, which would thus classify it as a "utility"
within the tax law. The statute characterized a utility, for the purpose of taxation, as "every
person subject to the supervision of the state department of public service. . .and. . .every
person (whether or not such a person is subject to such supervision) who sells gas, electricity,
steam; water, refrigeration, telephony or telegraphy . . . ." N.Y. TAX LAw § 186-a(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1977-1978). Since Quotron was not "subject to the supervision of the state
department of public service" and because it was more than a conduit for information, the
court concluded that "Quotron cannot be said to be 'directly in competition with ordinary
[telegraph companies]' and therefore is not a 'utility' as defined by section 186-a of the Tax
Law." 39 N.Y.2d at 432, 348 N.E.2d at 606, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 149. The New York Court of
Appeals agreed with the petitioner on the ground that Quotron not only acted as a mere
conduit of information, but that the company also determined the input of its transmissions
by securing data from various sources and storing it in a computer for transmission upon the
request of a customer. Id. at 431-32, 348 N.E.2d at 606, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 149. In granting the
declaratory judgment, the court rejected the Tax Commission's reliance on New York Quota-
tion Co. v. Bragalini, 7 App. Div. 2d 586, 184 N.Y.S.2d 924 (3d Dep't 1959), distinguishing it
on the facts. 39 N.Y.2d at 432-33, 348 N.E.2d at 606, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 149. In contrast to
Quotron Systems, New York Quotation Company had been given stock market information
by the New York Stock Exchange, "serving merely as a conduit or transmitter of the informa-
tion to its customers. - . [This] suggests that it could be considered to have been 'directly
in competition with ordinary [telegraph companies].'" Id. at 433, 348 N.E.2d at 607, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 149.
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pears that the content of this "rule of reason" governing statutory
construction is twofold. First, there is a practical element in which
the reviewing court applies its own jurisprudential sense of fairness,
as an impartial arbiter in reviewing the agency's interpretation of
its mandate. Second, there is a key judicial element in that the
reviewing court will look to prior authority interpreting both the
statute in question and related statutes in its own and other juris-
dictions.
Challenges to Agency Application of Regulations
An aggrieved party may claim that an administrative agency
has misapplied or misinterpreted its own regulations. Such was the
case in Reyes v. Dumpson"I in which the court sustained peti-
tioner's claim that limitations imposed by a Department of Social
Services regulation upon the recoupment of welfare overpayments
resulting from a recipient's willful concealment of information were
applicable to the recoupment of advance shelter allowances granted
pursuant to another regulation.4 ' The Appellate Division and the
Court of Appeals majorities both reasoned that there is no rational
basis for distinguishing recoupment of fraudulently obtained bene-
fits from recoupment of advance shelter allowances necessitated by
mismanagement of assistance funds.' Again, as in statutory chal-
lenges, it can be seen that despite the usual judicial deference to
agency construction of governing statutes and regulations, if the
court perceives that the agency has acted in an unreasonable man-
ner, it will annul the agency decision. 4 ' The Reyes majority relied
largely on considerations of fairness, concluding that the agreement,
pursuant to regulation requiring a recipient of advance shelter al-
lowances to repay the amount advanced over a 6-month period,
could not be deemed a fully voluntary choice in light of the alterna-
tive of eviction. 47 The majority also drew upon other authority to
sustain its decision: federal regulations restricting recoupment.48
Thus, the Reyes decision indicates that the rule of reason, discussed
above, is equally applicable to challenges to agency application of
its own regulations.' 4'
4 40 N.Y.2d 725, 358 N.E.2d 510, 389 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1976).
" Id. at 727, 358 N.E.2d at 512, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
' Id.; 51 App. Div. 2d 903, 905, 38 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60 (1976)(mem.).
248 See notes 132-133 and accompanying text supra.
" 40 N.Y.2d at 728, 368 N.E.2d at 512, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
, s Id. at 729, 358 N.E.2d at 513, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 830. Federally funded programs are
similarly restricted by federal regulation in that recoupment must not result in undue hard-
ship. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 [fl (1977).
'' See text following note 142 supra.
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Challenges to Administrative Penalties and Remedies
Courts exercise minimal control over relief granted or penalties
inflicted as a result of agency decision.'50 However, claims that an
agency has exceeded its statutory power or acted arbitrarily and
capriciously with respect to dispositions following decision are often
advanced."5 ' Generally, challenges to penalties arise in the context
of agencies charged with licensing responsibilities.'52 The rule ap-
plied in such cases was articulated in Butterly & Green v.
Lomenzo.5 3 Administrative sanctions will be set aside only if "so
disproportionate to the offense in light of the circumstances as to
be shocking to one's sense of fairness and disproportionately un-fair."?)15
In Butterly & Green, which concerned the Department of
State's regulation of real estate brokers, the court expressed the
view that the licensing agency should be granted considerable lati-
tude in imposing punishment because of its overall responsibility for
regulating a profession for the protection of the public.'55 There have
been cases, however, in which administrative penalties have been
overturned as an abuse of discretion. In Ahsaf v. Nyquist,'51 the New
"I See notes 132-133 and accompanying text supra. There is a general presumption that
the agency's actions are warranted and the courts usually defer to the expertise of the agency.
Note 6 supra; see, e.g., Kostika v. Cuomo, 41 N.Y.2d 673, 363 N.E.2d 568, 394 N.Y.S.2d 862
(1977); Ahsaf v. Nyquist, 37 N.Y.2d 182, 332 N.E.2d 880, 371 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1975); Pell v.
Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 313 N.E.2d 321, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1974); La Rosa v. Police
Dep't, 55 App. Div. 2d 890, 391 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1st Dep't 1977)(mem.).
15 The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules itself envisions review of such matters
by providing that a court may decide "[w]hether a determination . ..was arbitrary and
capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as the the measure or mode
of penalty or discipline imposed .... " N.Y. Civ. PaAc. LAw § 7803 (McKinney 1977); see
cases cited in note 149 supra.
,52 In the area of licensing, agencies have broad discretionary powers and their actions
will be measured according to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See note 145 supra;
see, e.g., Wager v. State Liquor Auth., 4 N.Y.2d 465, 151 N.E.2d 869, 176 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1958);
Quintard Assoc. Ltd. v. State Liquor Auth., 57 App. Div. 2d 462, 394 N.Y.S.2d 960 (4th Dep't
1977); Pasta Chef, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 54 App. Div. 2d 1112, 389 N.Y.S.2d 72 (4th
Dep't 1976)(mem.).
1- 36 N.Y.2d 250, 326 N.E.2d 799, 367 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1975).
154 Id. at 254, 326 N.E.2d at 803, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 234 (quoting Pell v. Board of Educ., 34
N.Y.2d 222, 233, 313 N.E.2d 321, 327, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 841 (1974)); see Kones v. Nyquist,
52 App. Div. 2d 1000, 383 N.Y.S.2d 659 (3d Dep't 1976)(mem.); Leonard v. Jones, 41 App.
Div. 2d 570, 339 N.Y.S.2d 559 (3d Dep't 1973)(mem.); Stolz v. Board of Regents, 4 App. Div.
2d 361, 165 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dep't 1957).
015 36 N.Y.2d at 256, 326 N.E.2d at 803, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 234 (1975). Butterly affirmed a
determination by the Secretary of State that the brokers in question engaged in unfair sales
methods by limiting the client's choice of housing according to race.
156 37 N.Y.2d 182, 332 N.E.2d 880, 371 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1975).
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York Court of Appeals found that the license of a practical nurse
had been revoked by the Board of Regents on the basis of alleged
misconduct that had not been charged or proven during the discipli-
nary proceedings. 57 The hearing panel had found the petitioner
guilty of two of the charges against her, addiction to the use of
narcotics and unprofessional conduct resulting from such addiction,
and placed petitioner on probation for 5 years."' The Regents Com-
mittee decided against the probationary retention of petitioner's
license on an asserted finding of "lack of candor," an offense not
specifically charged and to which she had no opportunity to re-
spond.' 59 The court concluded that the board's imposition of a
harsher penalty under such circumstances constituted an abuse of
discretion and thus remanded the case to the Board of Regents for
reconsideration of the penalty.60
The increased likelihood of judicial intervention in cases where
the licensing agency imposes the drastic sanction of outright license
revocation is also illustrated by Shore Haven v. State Liquor
Authority.'6 In Shore Haven, the State Liquor Authority cancelled
a license and denied the petitioner's application for a renewal when
it was found that the licensee had failed to maintain adequate busi-
ness records on the premises.'62 The record, however, revealed no
evidence of "willful deception or corruption or the likelihood of ei-
ther" and thus the court concluded that revocation of petitioner's
license constituted an abuse of discretion.' The court was careful
to reaffirm the narrow scope of review in administrative penalty
cases, established in Butterly & Green, emphasizing that there was
no evidence of "prejudice to the public interest."'' 4 While in rare
cases then, the courts will set aside penalties inflicted by licensing
agencies, generally the judiciary will exercise great restraint in re-
viewing the propriety of administrative penalties and will defer to
the exercise of administrative discretion.
I- Id. at 185, 332 N.E.2d at 882, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
,' Id.
"' Id. at 185-86, 332 N.E.2d at 842, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
,, Id. at 186, 332 N.E.2d at 882, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
,' Id. at 187, 332 N.E.2d at 883, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
'' Id. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Law provides that "[e]ach retail licensee for on-
premises consumption shall keep and maintain upon the licensed premises, adequate books
and records of all transactions involving the business. . . . -Such books and records shall be
available for inspection by any authorized representative of the liquor authority." N.Y. ALCo.
BEy. CoNT. LAW § 106(12) (McKinney 1970).
,s 37 N.Y.2d at 189, 332 N.E.2d at 884, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
'" Id. at 190-91, 332 N.E.2d at 885, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 712-13.
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Finally, it is important to note that the same wide degree of
discretion available to an agency in imposing a penalty also applies
when relief is granted. The courts, however, have not hesitated to
set aside remedies which may be deemed "erroneous as a matter of
law."'165 Usually, this signifies that supervening public policy limits
the agency's exercise of discretion. In New York State Institute of
Technology v. State Division of Human Rights6' the New York
Court of Appeals held that the specialized balancing of subjective
and objective criteria which results in a tenure decision should not
be overridden by administrative officials who have no expertise in
the area of education and whose interests are conditioned by their
singular responsibility to enforce the anti-discrimination laws. The
court cautioned, however, that in extraordinary cases where an in-
stitution has failed to eliminate discriminatory practices, and no
other redress for such practices would be effective, the remedy of
tenure may be appropriate.16 7
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to examine the methodology of judicial
review of various types of decisions made by administrative agen-
cies. In treating this broad subject the focus has been placed upon
certain issues which are frequently raised and recent cases of partic-
ular interest.
It is important to understand that the degree to which the court
will engage in review of administrative decisions varies with the
nature of the issue raised. As to matters of fact, the courts will defer
to and are generally bound by the factual findings of the administra-
tive agency. Nevertheless, as to ultimate determinations and the
drawing of legal inferences the court is likely to subject the agency's
decision to a greater degree of scrutiny. When the issues raised by
an individual challenging agency action concern matters of law such
"I Robertson v. Lavine, 71 Misc. 2d 757, 337 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1972) (mem.).
666 40 N.Y.2d 316, 353 N.E.2d 598, 386 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1976).
16, Id. at 326, 353 N.E.2d at 604, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 691. The court, however, exercised great
caution in recognizing this possibility:
Only where the institution's tenure procedures are irreparably tainted and further
recourse to them would be futile, rendering a fair consideration impossible, might
the commissioner consider bypassing the normal university channels. . . .More-
over even in the extraordinary case where a grant of tenure might serve as an
appropriate remedy, the commissioner should not impose such a requirement with-
out consulting with the administration of the institution and without considering
the effect of such an order on the institution and its faculty.
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as constitutional and statutory controls on agency action, the court
is free to intervene in the administrative process. Two values are
counterbalanced when statutory challenges are advanced. An
agency's interpretation of its own statutory mandate will be af-
forded some weight by a reviewing court. On the other hand, courts
recognize that administrative officials are charged with the respon-
sibility of enforcing a particular statute and that these officials are
sometimes myopic in their eagerness to assert what they perceive to
be their legislatively conferred authority. Thus, the courts, applying
a rule of reason, act as the final arbiter over the administrative
exercise of statutory authority. Once the substantive administrative
decision has passed judicial muster, the courts will only interfere in
the administrative grant of a remedy or imposition of a penalty in
extraordinary circumstances.
This Article has sought to identify the variety of factors that
are important to an understanding of judicial review of administra-
tive decisions in New York. As Professor Davis has stated, however,
"the scope of review in any particular case depends much more upon
the various factors that guide the exercise of judicial discretion than
it depends upon judicial fidelity to any verbal formula." 168
"I DAviS, supra note 1, § 30.14.
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